Lynn Landes 
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Southwest Voter Registration Education Project, et al. v. Kevin Shelley, California Secretary of State (Case No. 03-56498)

Amicus Curiae

I believe that I am bringing “to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court.” Rule 37(1), Rules of the Supreme Court of the U.S.

I am a freelance journalist who has been covering the issue of voting technology and democracy for the past year. I believe that I am the foremost expert in this field. I wish it were someone with more credentials than a BA in political science from Temple University (1976). My articles and reporter's notes can be found at http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingSecurity.htm

Lynn Landes
217 S. Jessup Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 629-3553

 

The court has been presented with a false set of choices by plaintiffs - that other voting technologies are more secure than the punchcard system. That does not appear to be the case. The CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project (Attachment 1), the most comprehensive and independent analysis of voting systems to date, indicates that touchscreen machines (DRE) are more likely to loose votes than the punchcard voting system, which appellants have disparaged in their declarations. Plaintiffs have made it clear in their public statements that they want the election delayed until March so that counties may purchase and install touchscreen machines. Henry E. Brady, who provided expert testimony in this case, issued a study in September 2001 that was funded by Sequoia Voting Systems, considered to be the third largest voting systems company in the United States. At the time of Dr. Brady’s separate study for this lawsuit, only one county (Riverside) in California was using Touchscreens. Yet, in Dr. Brady’s  “declaration” Figure 1, Residual Vote Rate in 2000 in California by Type of Voting System, he puts all types of systems at the same percentage of residual (lost) votes except punchcards.  The rates may or may not be correct, but the small sampling provided by Riverside, does not reflect an accurate picture of the problems experienced nationwide with touchscreen machines, particularly in the 2002 elections. (Attachment 2)

The court has also been presented a false choice by defendants, that the election should be held on October 7, 2003 because time is more important than how the election is run. Democracy is not on a stopwatch, where time is more important than how the race is won. And how the race is won, is at issue.

To my knowledge, no study addresses the statistical probability of vote tampering or manipulation (i.e., vote fraud) compared to the degree of sophistication of each type of voting technology. Although, common knowledge and logic, may indicate that the more sophisticated the technology, the greater ability, if not likelihood, of vote tampering or technical failure.

There are three steps to the voting process: the voter's selection of a candidate (example: a checkmark next to a candidate's name), casting the vote (example: putting the ballot into the ballot box), and counting the vote. The first step should be concealed, but the second two steps must be open to public observance and inspection. Sophisticated technology makes it impossible for the public, poll watchers, or Federal Observers to observe whether the casting and counting of the vote is done properly. To my knowledge, it also makes impossible, or at least discourages, a voter's right or ability to write-in a candidate's name on a ballot.

REQUEST:

I request that, whenever the election does take place, the court prohibit the use of any voting technology that is more sophisticated than a pencil and paper, because the use of sophisticated voting technology violates a citizen's right to vote and to have that vote counted properly under the U.S. Constitution, The Voting Rights Act, and federal law. The use of sophisticated voting technology introduces concealment and secrecy to that part of the voting process that depends on public oversight and inspection in order to ensure an honest election.

Background:

Since the first use of the lever voting machine in Lockport, New York in 1892, voting machines have slowly but surely taken over the process of casting and counting the vote from the public, and therefore concealed that process from poll watchers and Federal Observers. While most of the world's citizens still use paper and pencil to select and elect their political leaders, about 1% of Americans have their votes hand-cast and hand-counted. Not only are our votes being cast and counted by technology, those who control that technology are, for the most part, private corporations. Even if the government controlled the voting process, the concealment inherent in the use of sophisticated voting technology is unconstitutional. To make matters worse, there is no federal government agency that has regulatory authority over the elections industry. Anyone can own a vote systems company, felon or foreigner, office holder or political candidate.  Conflicts-of-interest or monopolistic business practices do not apply to voting systems companies. As the situation stands today, three corporations (Election Systems and Software - ES&S, Diebold, and Sequoia) sell and service the machines and software that counts about 80% of the electronic vote in the U.S.. ES&S, the nation's largest voting company, is owned by the Omaha World Herald Company. Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) was the past president of American Information Systems, the company that counted the votes in his first election. AIS then merged with Business Records Corporation to form ES&S, which then proceeded to count the votes in Senator Hagel's second election. At that time, it has been reported, that the Senator had a substantial financial interest in the company. Sequoia is owned by De La Rue, a British-based company whose machines will count the votes in more California counties than any other company in the upcoming recall election. De La Rue is the world's largest commercial security printer and papermaker and owns a 20% stake in Camelot, the operator of the Great Britain's National Lottery. The Internet voting business is dominated by two corporations: Accenture, which is based in the British territory of Bermuda, and VoteHere from Seattle, Washington. The U.S. Department of Defense recently awarded a coalition of corporations, led by Accenture, the contract to provide the Internet service that will count the votes of the U.S. military and other civilians in the 2004 presidential election. As many as 6 million voters could use their system. Accenture was formally known as Andersen Consulting. The current Chairman of VoteHere, the leading worldwide supplier of Internet voting technology, is Admiral Bill Owens, a former senior military assistant to both Secretaries of Defense Frank Carlucci and Dick Cheney. Ex-CIA director Robert Gates, who was caught up in the Iran Contra scandal, also sits on the VoteHere board. But there are many other corporations that work with the top voting companies: Microsoft, Dell, Cisco and various military defense companies, such as Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Unisys, National Semiconductor, and (Ross) Perot Systems Government Services. Populex is creating an electronic voting system for Illinois. It has on its advisory board, Frank Carlucci of The Carlyle Group. The boards of many of these companies are dominated by top donors to the Republican Party, former high ranking military officers, and several ex-CIA directors. The CIA directors include: James Woolsey, Bobby Ray Inman, and John Deutch, and as mentioned before, Robert Gates and Frank Carlucci. The CIA, it should be remembered, has a decades-long track record of assisting in the brutal overthrow of democratically elected governments around the world. There are no mandatory federal standards that apply to this industry. The standards and certification process that does exist lies in the hands of an industry friendly organization called the National Association of Election Directors (NASED). As it is, the elections industry has declared its software proprietary, therefore not open to inspection by anyone other than the three NASED-appointed inspectors. Even if the software were open to inspection, technology experts agree that there are an endless variety of ways to manipulate votes and remain undetected. There is a long history of voting irregularities using voting technology. (Attachment 2) Even in the absence of any such history, the potential for abuse is enough to prohibit the use of sophisticated technology. And the more sophisticated the technology, the greater the opportunity for vote fraud or technical failure.

QUESTIONS: 

What is a vote? In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court said that, A "legal vote," as determined by the Supreme Court, is "one in which there is a 'clear indication of the intent of the voter.'"  Sophisticated voting technology reflects the action of the technology first, and the intent of the voter, maybe.

What process ensures a fair election under federal law?  The voter must be able to personally cast their vote without relying on technology any more sophisticated than a paper and pencil; they then must be able to deposit their paper ballot into a box; lastly, poll watchers and Federal Observers must be allowed to observe paper ballots being hand-counted by election officials at the local precinct.

What violations of federal law occur through the use of sophisticated technology? When machines are in the voting booth, or through the use of Internet technology, three violations of federal law take place: inability to observe if voting machines properly register votes; inability to observe if voting machines properly count votes; inability to enforce the Voting Rights Act, because of the inability to observe if voting machines are properly registering or counting votes.

Why must the vote be on paper and readable? An electronic image or paper tab that is produced by machines is evidence of what the machine did, but perhaps not what the voter intended; an electronic image or paper tab that is produced by machines does not constitute "hard" evidence of the voter's intention, but circumstantial evidence; without a readable paper ballot, the voter can't verify that they, in fact, voted and who they voted for; and lastly, in order to observe the original count and to observe any possible recounts.

Why must the ballots be counted at the local precinct? Counting the ballots at the local precinct is necessary to ensure against vote tampering or accidental loss in the eventual transfer of ballots to a central location. A local count is also needed to keep the public in the process, so that local poll watchers can monitor the count, and for Federal Observers to perform their duties under federal law.

Why must paper ballots be hand counted? Any type of machine used to scan paper ballots is not observable and therefore violates federal law. Mechanical, electronic, online, or computerized vote tabulation is an open doors to vote manipulation or technical failure.

Does federal law prohibit the use of voting machines and Internet technology? Yes, in that all machines, including Internet technology, by their very design constitute concealment and therefore an inability for poll watchers to watch or for federal observers to observe that part of the voting process (the casting and counting of votes) that must be observable in order to ensure a fair election. The actual candidate selection is the only part of the voting process that should be concealed.

What about the role of voting technology to prevent over-voting or under-voting, or other types of mishaps? In addition to the constant issue of concealment, there is also the need to spread or minimize the risk of mishap or malfeasance. Individuals may make mistakes or attempt vote fraud in the selection, casting, and counting of ballots, but those mistakes or malfeasance, when applied to paper ballots that are hand-cast and hand-counted, are spread across a large population of individuals. There are millions of voters and thousands of poll watchers that can and will make mistakes. However, through voting technology, mistakes or malfeasance is concentrated in the hands of a relatively few individuals (i.e., putting all the eggs in one basket).

Does it matter who controls the technology, business people or government employees?  Yes and no. The privatization of the voting process, including the registration of voters and the voting process itself, is not in the public's interest on its face. Voting is the centerpiece of a democratic republic and therefore is not a service that should be outsourced or trusted to the private sector. However, neither government employees and business people should be trusted with sophisticated voting technology that could be used to engage in vote tampering, or vulnerable to programming error and/or technical failure. 

What about the role of voting technology to count the vote quicker or encourage voter participation? Our constitutional guarantee to vote and to have our votes counted properly cannot be trumped by convenience or the promise of greater voter participation. The United States is the world's leader in the use of sophisticated voting technology and holds last place for voter participation, around 30% for off-year elections.

What about the role of voting technology to assist the disabled? It has not been proven, to my knowledge, that the disabled cannot cast a secret vote without using sophisticated voting technology. But if that were the case, the question becomes: should the disabled community's ability to cast a secret vote trump the public's right to know that all votes are cast and counted properly? No, if sophisticated voting technology is allowed to capture any segment of the voting population, such as the disabled, the real effect is to transfer to those individuals who control the voting technology, that population of voters. There are millions of disabled voters. Controlling their votes could provide the margin of victory in any number of elections. It is in the public's interest and in conformity to federal law, to provide the disabled physical with assistance, if needed, therefore spreading the risk of vote tampering or mishap, across a large population of individuals, rather than allowing those who control technology to control the vote. The sacrifice of a secret vote does not trump the public's right to know that all votes are cast and counted properly. There is also mounting evidence that the use of technology does not provide for real secrecy in the voting booth, in any case. Voting technology has been counting votes in order of the arrival of the voter in the polling precinct since lever machines were first introduced in the 1892, and optical scanners in 1964. So that to some extent a secret vote has not been guaranteed for quite some time.  With regard to using the Internet and casting a secret ballot, voting security expert Dr. Rebecca Mercuri (2001) notes, "Encryption provides no assurance of privacy or accuracy of ballots cast. Cryptographic systems, even strong ones, can be cracked or hacked, thus leaving the ballot contents along with the identity of the voter open to perusal."  

Do voting machines deny candidates the right to a legitimate recount?  Yes, the paper trails produced, even by the old fashioned lever machines, are circumstantial evidence of a vote; a record of what the machine did, not the voter. According to Dr. Rebecca Mercuri, "Any programmer can write code that displays one thing on a screen, records something else, and prints yet another result. There is no known way to ensure that this is not happening inside of a voting system." 

The right to have your vote cast and counted properly has been affirmed in the following three cases:

Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act under the Fourteen and Fifteenth Amendment is at the heart of the constitutional issue involving the use of sophisticated voting technology.  

15th Amendment (1870): http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.amendmentxv.html Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The role of Federal Observers originates with the 15th Amendment and the Voting Rights Act. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, SEC. 2, states, "No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color."  http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/intro/intro_b.htm)

Regarding the 14th Amendment, voting machines and technology constitute a secret or 'concealed' registration and tabulation of the vote which cannot be observed by Federal Examiners (as authorized under federal law), which makes the examiner's role in that regard - moot, and federal law - unenforceable. Therefore, all voting machines may be a violation of U.S. Code: Title 42 - The Public Health and Welfare, Chapter 20 - Elective Franchise, Subchapter I-A Enforcement of Voting Rights, Sec. 1973. The use of mechanical, electric, and/or computer devices that by their very design and structure "conceal" vote casting and/or counting and therefore cannot be observed to ensure accuracy, is an apparent violation of the following: U.S. Code: http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/42/ch20.html

CHAPTER 20 - ELECTIVE FRANCHISE  http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/42/1973f.html Sec. 1973f. - "Observers at elections; assignment; duties; reports: Whenever an examiner is serving under subchapters I-A to I-C of this title in any political subdivision, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management may assign, at the request of the Attorney General, one or more persons, who may be officers of the United States, (1) to enter and attend at any place for holding an election in such subdivision for the purpose of observing whether persons who are entitled to vote are being permitted to vote, and (2) to enter and attend at any place for tabulating the votes cast at any election held in such subdivision for the purpose of observing whether votes cast by persons entitled to vote are being properly tabulated. Such persons so assigned shall report to an examiner appointed for such political subdivision, to the Attorney General, and if the appointment of examiners has been authorized pursuant to section 1973a(a) of this title, to the court."

Under http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/42/1973i.html Sec. 1973i. Prohibited acts: (a) Failure or refusal to permit casting or tabulation of vote (d) Falsification or concealment of material facts or giving of false statements in matters within jurisdiction of examiners or hearing officers; penalties. Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of an examiner or hearing officer knowingly and willfully falsifies or conceals a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 

Federal observers have several obstacles in the course of enforcing voting rights protections in regards to voting machines including, but not limited to the following: 1) the physical inability to observe what goes on inside of a voting machine, 2) the voting machine companies have declared "proprietary" or "trade secret" rights as legal grounds for not allowing inspections of machines, 2) inspections that have been allowed on voting machines discovered a source codes that were indecipherable, 3) voting machines that use modems can manipulate voting results during an election from remote locations, even from satellites. Other mechanisms exist to electronically manipulate voting machines before or after an election.

Interlocking issues include: the right to contest an election; the right to a recount; and the right to paper ballots. 

ROUDEBUSH v. HARTKE, 405 U.S. 15 (1972) is about the right to contest an election. The Court said, "Art. I, 4, empowers the States to regulate the conduct of senatorial elections. 21 This Court has recognized the breadth of those powers: "It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the [405 U.S. 15, 25]   fundamental right involved." Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 . "A recount is an integral part of the Indiana electoral process and is within the ambit of the broad powers delegated to the States by Art. I, 4.  - "The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators." Nevertheless, the recount supersedes the initial count even though a certificate of election may have been issued. 29-5415."

This is not directly related to voting machines vs paper ballots, however, it does establish the right to a recount of ballots. Most voting technology does not provide a paper ballot. In any event, the ballots or paper trails produced, even by the old fashioned lever machines, are a record of what the machine did, not the voter.

U.S. Code, Title 1 Chapter 1 Sec. 5. Determination of controversy as to appointment of electors http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/3/5.html "If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have been made at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said day, and made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State is concerned."

U.S. Code, Title 1 Chapter 1 Sec. 6. - Credentials of electors; transmission to Archivist of the United States and to Congress; public inspection http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/3/6.html It shall be the duty of the executive of each State, as soon as practicable after the conclusion of the appointment of the electors in such State by the final ascertainment, under and in pursuance of the laws of such State providing for such ascertainment, to communicate by registered mail under the seal of the State to the Archivist of the United States a certificate of such ascertainment of the electors appointed, setting forth the names of such electors and the canvass or other ascertainment under the laws of such State of the number of votes given or cast for each person for whose appointment any and all votes have been given or cast; and it shall also thereupon be the duty of the executive of each State to deliver to the electors of such State, on or before the day on which they are required by section 7 of this title to meet, six duplicate-originals of the same certificate under the seal of the State; and if there shall have been any final determination in a State in the manner provided for by law of a controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, it shall be the duty of the executive of such State, as soon as practicable after such determination, to communicate under the seal of the State to the Archivist of the United States a certificate of such determination in form and manner as the same shall have been made; and the certificate or certificates so received by the Archivist of the United States shall be preserved by him for one year and shall be a part of the public records of his office and shall be open to public inspection; and the Archivist of the United States at the first meeting of Congress thereafter shall transmit to the two Houses of Congress copies in full of each and every such certificate so received at the National Archives and Records Administration

In over 98% of all elections, technology is being used to cast and count votes. Americans have lost to technology, the right to vote and to have that vote counted properly. Democracy is purported to be for, of, and by the people. As it stands today in America, voting technology and those who control it are voting for our political leaders, not the people.

ATTACHMENT 1

Excerpts from: REPORT OF THE CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT 
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/july01/July01_VTP_%20Voting_Report_Entire.pdf

(page 20)

How Much Does Voting Equipment Contribute to Lost Votes?

Residual Votes and Lost Votes

Residual votes—the number of uncounted, unmarked, and spoiled ballots—provide a yardstick for measuring the effect of different machine types on the incidence of lost votes. BALLOTS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESIDUAL VOTES 

RESIDUAL VOTES = Uncounted ballots + Unmarked ballots + "Overvoted ballots"

Over the past four presidential elections, the rate of residual votes in presidential elections was slightly over two percent. This means that in a typical presidential election over two million voters did not have a presidential vote recorded for their ballots. The presidential race is the "top of the ticket." The rate of residual votes is even higher down the ballot—five percent for Senate and gubernatorial elections. In other words, almost five million votes are not recorded for other prominent statewide offices.

(page 21)

A ballot may show no vote because the machine failed to record the voter’s preferences, because the voter made a mistake or was confused, or because the voter did not wish to vote for that office. The first two reasons would mean lost votes. The third would not be a lost vote, but would be a correct recording of the voter’s preferences. It is difficult to judge intentions, but exit polls suggest approximately thirty percent of residual votes are intentional. This implies that 1.5 million presidential votes are lost each election; 3.5 million votes for governor and senator are lost each cycle. 

A more conservative measure of the number of votes lost due to equipment is the number of ballots for which voters chose more than one candidate—an overvote. We focus on residual votes because the distinction of overvotes from other kinds of errors is a false one.

Technology can enable or interfere with voting in many ways. Lost votes are not just a matter of preventing someone from accidentally voting twice. Vote loss can happen because of machine failures. Vote loss also happens because ballot designs or user interfaces confuse voters or even obscure how to vote. Ballot and user interface design is perhaps the most important cause of vote loss, and different types of technology rely on specific types of ballots and user interfaces.

Whatever the cause, the residual vote rate should not depend on what equipment is used. But it does.

The Relationship between Voting Equipment and Residual Votes

A simple table reveals the extent to which equipment affects the number of votes lost. Table 1 presents the residual votes in presidential elections and in Senate and gubernatorial elections as a percent of all ballots cast over the past decade.

Table 1

RESIDUAL(lost) VOTES AS A PERCENT OF ALL BALLOTS CAST, 1988-2000
(RESIDUAL VOTES = Uncounted ballots + Unmarked ballots + "Overvoted ballots")
**this table has been rearranged by Lynn Landes of www.EcoTalk.org to demonstrate more readily which systems perform the best) 

Machine Type

President 
% votes lost

Governor & Senator 
% votes lost

% of votes lost on average

Optical Scan

1.5

3.5

2.5

Paper Ballot 
(hand counted)

1.8

3.3

2.55

Punch Card

2.5

4.7

3.6

Electronic (DRE)

2.3

5.9

4.1

Lever Machine

1.5

7.6

4.55

The figures in Table 1 reveal a striking pattern. Some technologies consistently perform well on average, and some technologies have excessively high rates of residual votes. In particular, paper ballot systems tend to show lower residual votes than lever machines and electronic machines. To the extent that there is an exception to this pattern it arises with punch cards.

Optically scanned paper and hand-counted paper ballots have consistently shown the best average performance. Scanners have the lowest rate of uncounted, unmarked, and spoiled ballots in presidential races and in Senate and gubernatorial races. Counties using optical scanning have averaged a residual vote rate of 1.5 percent in presidential elections and 3.5 percent in Senate and gubernatorial elections over the past twelve years. Hand-counted paper has shown similarly low residual vote rates.

Punch cards, the other paper based system, lose at least 50 percent more votes than optically scanned paper ballots. Punch cards have averaged a residual vote rate of 2.5 percent in presidential elections and 4.7 percent down the ballot. Over thirty million voters used punch cards in the 2000 election. Had those voters used optical scanning there would have been 300,000 more votes recorded in the 2000 presidential election nation-wide and 420,000 more votes in Senate and gubernatorial elections. Counties using paper ballot systems should choose either traditional hand counting or optical scanning in order to lower the number of lost votes.

(page 23)

Machine voting, on the whole, has performed significantly worse than the paper systems. Lever machines lost relatively few votes in the past four presidential elections, averaging a residual vote rate of 1.5 percent. Electronic machines lost nearly as much as punch cards, averaging 2.3 percent over the past four elections. The more severe problems appear down the ballot with these technologies, and here we see real concern with the continued use of lever machines. In recent Senate and gubernatorial elections, the average residual vote rates of lever machines and electronic machines were 7.6 percent and 5.9 percent, respectively, of all ballots cast. Had the counties using lever machines used optical scanning, we estimate that there would have been 830,000 more votes recorded in Senate and gubernatorial elections.

These patterns hold up to closer statistical scrutiny, holding constant turnout, income, racial composition of counties, age distributions of counties, literacy rates, the year of a shift in technology, the number of offices and candidates on the ballot, and other factors that operate in a county or in a particular year. For a fuller discussion see our report "Residual Votes Attributable to Technology: An Assessment of the Reliability of Existing Voting Equipment," available at www.vote.caltech.edu.

The immediate implication of our analysis is that the U.S. can lower the number of lost votes in 2004 by replacing punch cards and lever machines with optical scanning. Punch cards and levers are, in our assessment, dominated technologies. That is, there are voting technologies available today that are superior, from the perspective of lost votes. Scanners consistently perform better than punch cards and levers. We also believe that optical scanning dominates older full-faced, push button DREs, which comprise fully two-thirds of the electronic machines in our analysis. Touchscreens are, in our opinion, still unproven. Some counties, like Riverside, California, have had good experiences; other counties like Beaver County, Pennsylvania, and many counties in New Mexico had very high residual vote rates (over five percent in 2000).

This is not to say that optical scanning is an ideal system. It has plenty of faults and problems. This system also loses a significant number of ballots, though less on average than other systems. Election officials complain of paper jams, the cost of printing, and ballot management. Scanning is imperfect, but it is the best of what is. 

ATTACHMENT 2

Election Fraud and Irregularities - BY YEAR  (compilation by Lynn Landes)

  1. 1968 - Following widely publicized problems with punch cards in the 1968 election, IBM withdrew from the election machine business. http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/july01/July01_VTP_%20Voting_Report_Entire.pdf (Unfortunately, there's no documentation in this report. We'll keep searching.)

2.       1970s-1980s Ohio -The Cincinnati Bell-FBI scandal - The following are excerpts from the Cincinnati Post of October, 30th, 1987: Cincinnati Bell security supervisors ordered wire-taps installed on county computers before elections in the late 1970s and early 1980s that could have allowed vote totals to be altered, a former Bell employee says in a sworn court document. Leonard Gates, a 23-year Cincinnati Bell employee until he was fired in 1986, claims in a deposition filed Thursday in Hamilton County Common Pleas Court to have installed the wire-taps. Cincinnati Bell officials denied Gates’ allegations that are part of a six-year-old civil suit that contends the elections computer is subject o manipulation and fraud. Gates claims a security supervisor for the telephone company told him in 1979 that the firm had obtained a computer program through the FBI that gave it access to the county computer used to count votes.  http://www.ecotalk.org/Pandora'sBlackBox.htm 

3.       1970 Florida - Dade County. This is the election that started the Collier brothers on a decades-long investigation of computer vote-rigging and the major news networks complicity. On election day the networks claimed that the courthouse computer broke down. Before the breakdown candidate Ken Collier had 31% of the vote. 20 minutes later, the network reported that Collier had only 16%. The Colliers claim that election night computer breakdowns, followed by a sharp drop-off in votes for certain candidates, were a pattern repeating itself across the country. They later alleged in court that three University of Miami computer professors conspired with election officials and news network officials to rig elections in Florida. "One voting machine was used to accurately project (100% of the time) the entire election involving some 40 races and more than 250 candidates."   http://www.votescam.com/frame.html (VoteScam: The Stealing of America)

4.       1970 South Carolina - "In the first election I witnessed in South Carolina (it was 1970, I believe), a voting machine broke down in one of the largest black precincts in Charleston. It was in the middle of the morning rush. There were no replacement machines available, and while a repairman worked on the problem for a couple of hours, several hundred African-Americans eventually left the precinct without getting the chance to vote. I became righteously indignant, as I often was in those days, but my Charleston friends were philosophical. It happens every election, they told me. And so it did. Never the same precinct. Never the same time of day. Never the same problem with the machine. But for many elections afterward, somewhere in Charleston on election day, a voting machine in a black precinct would break down for an hour or two. Once is an accident. Twice is incredibly bad luck. Three times or more is a plan." http://www.safero.org/columns/unwrapped34.html 

5.       1972 Florida - Dade County. The election was a repeat of 1970 (see above) although Ken Collier was not a candidate this time. http://www.votescam.com/frame.html (VoteScam: The Stealing of America)

6.       1974 Florida - Dade County. The Collier brothers discover that the Printomatic voting machines contain pre-printed vote tabulations. Thousands of precinct workers walk out in protest, but the news media plays down the story. Both local authorities (Dade County attorney Janet Reno) and the Department of Justice under current election crimes chief, Craig DonSanto, refuse to investigate even though there have long been widespread rumors of rampant election fraud in Dade. http://www.votescam.com/frame.html (VoteScam: The Stealing of America)

7.       1980 Florida - History repeats itself again and again and again. "Undervotes"--the failure of votes to register on a voted ballot--occurred on about 10,000 ballots in Palm Beach County this year, where Vice President Al Gore has strong support. In 1988, in MacKay's four Democratic stronghold counties, there were 210,000 people who voted for president but did not vote in the U.S. Senate race. In a comparable U.S. Senate race in a presidential-election year--1980--in the same four counties, three out of every 100 presidential voters did not vote for senator. http://www.notablesoftware.com/Press/Dugger1.html 

  1. 1980 Utah - Salt Lake County. A last minute breakdown of one of Salt Lake County's two ballot reading computers caused a delay in production of the tally. No county totals were produced for two hours, and the final tally was produced at 5:39 a.m. the following morning. The situation was reported in an article in the Salt Lake Tribune on Nov. 6, 1980.

9.       1980 West Virginia - Following the general election of November, 1980, three defeated candidates charged gross violations of election laws in Kanawha County, the county in which Charleston is located. According to an article on June 2, 1981 in the Charleston Gazette [42], Darlene Kay Dotson, an employee in the office of the County Clerk, had stated in a deposition taken for Underwood's suit that the ballots from the election in question had been run through the computer on the day after the election to get "precinct-by-precinct reports." ...Appeals of the dismissal were similarly dismissed, and the U.S. Supreme Court announced on February 24, 1987 its refusal to hear the case. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 

  1. 1982 Indiana - Elkhart County, General election. A major source of problems in the election was the apparent failure to properly test the equipment prior to use. The losing candidates charged that no test of the automatic tabulating equipment was undertaken five days prior to the election, as required by the Indiana statute then in effect, and that only a superficial test was done at about 4 p.m. on election day. The losing candidates' case, brought before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, named the local board officials as defendants. It was alleged in the pleadings in that case that the computer system was not tested, that there was no error-free test of the system before the official count, that there was no actual count of the ballots and that the alleged count and certification of the vote count was fraudulent. The pleadings and briefs further stated that the control cards for the operation of the program were altered by the vendor representative during the counting, and that the acts by the election officials were willful, wanton, reckless and oppressive. However, the court entered a summary judgment on Feb. 21, 1985 against the losing candidates because, in the court's opinion, there were no allegations of any "willful conduct which undermines the organic processes by which candidates are elected" (language of an important precedent, Hennings v. Grafton) http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 

11.   1983-87 Illinois - "Saltman’s 1988 report cited an extensive series of tests of the computer counting systems used in Illinois from 1983-87 which tested tens of thousands of ballots instead of the usual three or four dozen used in most pre-election tests. In the Illinois test series, it was discovered that significant errors in the computers’ basic counting instructions were found in 20% of the tests. In 1988, Michael Harty, the Illinois director of voting systems and standards, pointed out that these gross "tabulation-program errors" would not have been caught by election authorities and lamented to the New Yorker. "At one point, we had tabulation errors in 28% of the systems tested, and nobody cared"."  http://www.ecotalk.org/Pandora'sBlackBox.htm / The Illinois State Board of Elections, Division of Voting Systems, under the direction of Michael L. Harty, has undertaken tests of vote-counting computer systems. Between 1983 and 1987, the division conducted 48 tests of the automatic tabulating equipment and computer programs in 41 election jurisdictions. The tests have involved anywhere from 1,000 to 65,000 test ballots. The division found apparent computer program tabulation errors in 11 of the election jurisdictions tested. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 

  1. 1984 Florida - Palm Beach County. Following the general election, David Anderson, defeated candidate for Property Appraiser of Palm Beach County, sued to contest the election of his opponent Rebecca Walker. [72] Anderson asked that the Court order a hand recount of the ballots, or a hand recount of at least several precincts in that election. The issues on which Anderson sued included handling of the ballots, precinct procedures for signing in voters, ballot secrecy, counting of punch card ballots, and possible manipulation of the computer program. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  2. 1984 Illinois - Effingham County, General Election: A county-level office was not being tabulated in five precincts, though votes were assigned to the office. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  3. 1984 Illinois - Jackson County, General Election: A translation error between precinct returns and the summary report caused the summary report to fail to properly reflect the precinct sum totals for certain candidates. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  4. 1984 Illinois - LaSalle County, General Election: The straight party vote was not being tabulated for all candidates in a party. In addition, when an overvote occurred in the straight party column and also in an individual candidate's punches on the same ballot, the candidates involved actually lost a vote, i.e., had their vote totals reduced by a vote (instead of simply being denied a vote). http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  5. 1984 Illinois - Grundy County, General Primary Election: Forty-seven percent of the precincts had one or more of the following types of errors: (1) the assignment of the wrong county board districts in the precincts, (2) the deletion of candidates in precincts, (3) the incorrect assignment of candidates to precincts, (4) assignment of only 2 vote for each vote cast, and (5) incorrect totals of precinct votes on the summary report for several candidates. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  6. 1984 Illinois - Rock Island County, General Primary Election: Two votes for each vote cast were being tabulated for a candidate. In addition, the "no" votes on a proposition were not being counted. Further, the summary report totals did not properly reflect precinct sum totals for several candidates. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  7. 1984 Illinois - Jackson County, General Election: Column binary punching appeared to cause severe tabulation delay. In addition, the card reader stopped occasionally during the tabulation of a precinct. When this condition occurred, the results already obtained had to be erased and all the ballots for the precinct had to be retabulated. The cause of this difficulty could not be immediately ascertained. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  8. 1984 Illinois - Will County, General Election: During the system test, the card reader was jammed twice by ballots. The ballots involved were almost completely destroyed in the process. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 

20.   1984 Maryland - On November 8, two days after the Tuesday, November 6, 1984 general election, and in accordance with the rules of the Maryland State Administrative Board of Election Laws (SABEL), voted punch card ballots from two districts of Carroll County were taken to a neighboring county, Frederick, to be rerun on an independently-managed system. It was clear from these reruns that one of the computers used was in error in determining the outcome of a contest between Wayne Cogswell and incumbent T. Edward Lippy, for Carroll County School Board. Manual counts of the votes on ballots from both Frederick and Carroll Counties showed that the Carroll County computer was the one that was incorrect. The initial but unofficial count, made public on the evening of the election, had incorrectly indicated that Cogswell was the winner. An investigation, undertaken the next day (November 9) by Craig Jester, a county computer program contractor, demonstrated that a wrong utility computer program for reading the ballot cards had been used. According to a July 11, 1985 story by Chris Guy in the Carroll County Times referring to the court-ordered recount, "...defeated candidate Wayne Cogswell had verification that use of an incorrect computer program caused a nearly 13,000-vote mistake in the unofficial totals released election night." http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 

  1. 1985 Illinois - Moline, Consolidated Municipal and Township Election. The following report is primarily based on an article in Illinois Issues, November, 1985, that was republished in a newsletter of the National Center for Policy Alternatives. [66] In this election on April 2, 1985, the failure of a card reader to read correctly caused a losing aldermanic candidate for Moline City Council to be put into office. The error was not rectified until about three months later. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  2. 1985 Illinois - Morgan County, Consolidated Election: No straight party votes registered for the candidates of a party. However, this did not affect the individual candidate totals. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  3. 1985 Illinois - Peoria County, Consolidated Election: The computer program misassigned straight party punches for a candidate for township supervisor. The candidate received a tally from a straight party punch for the opposite party but failed to receive a tally from the straight party punch of his own party. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  4. 1985 Illinois - Sangamon County, Consolidated Election: The computer program would not accept ballots with proper ballot style identifiers. This error was not discovered by the test previously run by the local jurisdiction. In addition, ballots in precincts with more than one ballot style did not contain different style identifiers. Thus, it would not have been possible to separate the voted ballots of the different styles. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  5. 1985 Illinois - Logan County, Consolidated Primary Election: Tabulation errors occurred when precincts were split by ward boundaries. When the same punch position was assigned to different candidates in different wards in the same precinct, votes for one of the candidates were not tallied by the computer program. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 

26.   1985 Texas - 03/26/1987 The Dallas Morning News The Texas secretary of state's office has decided to assign a computer expert and a lawyer as inspectors for the Dallas city elections on April 4 to check the county's computerized tabulating equipment. A spokesman for the office said Wednesday that the assignments were made after a briefing by the state attorney general's office, which has been investigating allegations of vote fraud in the tabulating system used in the 1985 mayor's race. Dallas County District Attorney John Vance said Monday that the attorney general's office has asked his staff for assistance in the investigation, which centers on the reliability of the vote-counting machines and whether they are vulnerable to fraud through subtle changes in computer programs. http://www.talion.com/election-machines.html also in  http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 

  1. 1986 Arizona -  Maricopa County. A clerical error that would have interchanged votes for the two major parties in this primary election was caught during testing. Pre-punches (ballot style identifiers) were incorrectly specified, and if the errors had not been caught, votes in the primary contests in each party would have been assigned to the other party during tallying. Poor communication between the county data processing department and the election administration contributed to the problem. A well-designed testing process caught the error, so that ballot counting during the actual election was not affected. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 

28.   1986 Georgia 11/07 - Atlanta Journal Constitution Computer troubles have been blamed for ballot discrepancies in a race that state Sen. Donn Peevy (D-Gwinnett) lost by eight votes. Frances Duncan, director of the state Election Division in the secretary of state's office, said Thursday a partial recount showed 400 fewer ballots cast in the Cates D precinct, 70 more ballots cast in the Dacula precinct, and 44 more ballots cast in the Lawrenceville precinct. The recount was started Wednesday night at the request of the Republican victor, former Lawrenceville Mayor Steve Pate, but was halted when the discrepancies appeared, said county Elections Superintendent Lloyd Harris. Harris blamed the problem on the computer used to recount the votes. He said an official from a California computer firm will fly to Georgia on Monday to make necessary program changes, and the recount won't be completed until early next week. http://www.talion.com/election-machines.html 

  1. 1986 Illinois - Elkhart County. Following the 1986 general election, a State-mandated recount was undertaken that included ballots from Elkhart County. In this recount, directed by Dean David Link of the Notre Dame Law School, it was discovered that the computer program used to count ballots in Elkhart County was not counting correctly according to Indiana law. ttp://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  2. 1986 Illinois - Whiteside County, General Primary Election: The system tabulated votes on ballots that contained invalid security codes (ballot style identifiers). http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  3. 1986 Illinois - Pulaski County, General Primary Election: The principal disk that contained the vote-tallying program failed to operate for the system test. The duplicate (backup) disk was employed. The principal disk operated correctly for the public test. No reason for the problem was discovered. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  4. 1986 Nebraska - "Back when (Chuck) Hagel first ran there for the U.S. Senate in 1996, his company's computer-controlled voting machines showed he'd won stunning upsets in both the primaries and the general election. The Washington Post (1/13/1997) said Hagel's "Senate victory against an incumbent Democratic governor was the major Republican upset in the November election." According to Bev Harris of www.blackboxvoting.com, Hagel won virtually every demographic group, including many largely Black communities that had never before voted Republican. Hagel was the first Republican in 24 years to win a Senate seat in Nebraska. Six years later Hagel ran again, this time against Democrat Charlie Matulka in 2002, and won in a landslide. As his hagel.senate.gov website says, Hagel "was re-elected to his second term in the United States Senate on November 5, 2002 with 83% of the vote. That represents the biggest political victory in the history of Nebraska." What Hagel's website fails to disclose is that about 80 percent of those votes were counted by computer-controlled voting machines put in place by the company affiliated with Hagel. Built by that company. Programmed by that company. "This is a big story, bigger than Watergate ever was," said Hagel's Democratic opponent in the 2002 Senate race, Charlie Matulka. "They say Hagel shocked the world, but he didn't shock me." http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0131-01.htm 
  5. 1986 Ohio - Stark County. An unprecedented court-ordered "audit" (hand recount) of a Stark County computer recount in a county commissioners primary contest again named as winner the candidate who had apparently won in the official results of the May 6, 1986 primary but lost in the computer recount. The "audit" revealed a computer program error that permitted over 100 invalid punchcard ballots to be counted in the recount. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm  
  6. 1986 Oklahoma - Oklahoma County In the general election difficulties perceived by an independent group of local observers involved, among other items, the operability of the precinct-located, mark-sense computers, and the anomalous numbers of counted ballots that were reported. The county signed a contract to purchase the mark-sense vote-counting equipment in the summer of 1984. During the November 4, 1986 general election, the number of non-processed ballots was over 2% in a significant number of precincts. According to State rules, the county Board of Elections "has the authority" [68] (but is not required) to recount precincts with over 2% non-processed ballots. The county board has used its discretion in selecting particular precincts for reprocessing. Reprocessing, if done at all, is done on the county's central computer. Not all precincts with over 2% non-processed ballots were reprocessed in the November, 1986 general election. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm  
  7. 1987 Illinois - City of Chicago, Consolidated General Election: The system test indicated an approximate 3% failure rate of program chips. The chips were improperly programmed or "burned." The malfunction would have been identified during the public test. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 
  8. 1987 Illinois - Boone County, Consolidated Primary Election: Due to substantial ballot quality defects, a system test could not be executed. New test ballots were ordered. http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachines-SaltmanReport.htm 

37.   1988 Florida - History repeats itself again and again and again. "Undervotes"--the failure of votes to register on a voted ballot--occurred on about 10,000 ballots in Palm Beach County this year, where Vice President Al Gore has strong support. In 1988, in MacKay's four Democratic stronghold counties, there were 210,000 people who voted for president but did not vote in the U.S. Senate race. In a comparable U.S. Senate race in a presidential-election year--1980--in the same four counties, three out of every 100 presidential voters did not vote for senator; in 1988, 14 of every 100 did not. In the entire state of Florida, excluding the four MacKay counties, fewer than one of 100 presidential voters--25,000--were not recorded as also voting in the Senate race. Three of the MacKay counties in 1988 are among Gore's big four recount counties. MacKay believed "very strongly" that the Senate election was stolen from him. He suspected, as a reason for the vote drop-off, the use, in the questioned counties, of a ballot layout that crowded the Senate race onto the bottom of the same page with the presidential race. The voting electorate for president dropped to 86% for the Senate, then jumped back up to 97% for secretary of state. Suspecting, too, "a problem in the [computerized vote-counting] software," MacKay asked that his campaign be permitted to examine it in five counties, but was refused on grounds that it was the secret property of the election-business companies. "A damned outrage," he said of this. http://www.notablesoftware.com/Press/Dugger1.html MacKay's campaign "late" polls had him ahead by 5-9%, according to Dugger in APR Reporter - Vol. 16, NO. 3

38.   1995 Louisiana - Republican Susan Bernecker, a popular first-time challenger for Jefferson Parish Council went down to defeat by a 33% to 58% margin. "In all of the 54 precincts the percentages were in the same one third / two third range – even in ones that I didn’t get out and pound the pavement". She cites another female candidate in the Orleans Parish who got 33% of the vote in every precinct. After the defeat, her suspicions aroused, Bernecker and a producer friend went down to the warehouse where the Sequoia Pacific computers had been taken after the election. She had her friend videotape her while she pressed the button next to her name on the ballot. To her dismay, the name of her primary opponent registered on a small LED located near the bottom of the machine that most voters apparently do not notice, since, according to a Sequoia Pacific official, it is two feet below the buttons. Bernecker recounts pressing her name again and again on 12 machines and she discovered that her name popped up in the LED only one out of every three times. The machine was far less fickle when her opponent’s button was pressed, counting his name faithfully every time but one, when the third-place candidate’s name appeared. Bernecker, a civic activist and the owner of a fitness and health center, cried foul, along with five other candidates, who all sued the elections commissioner and the city of Baton Rouge. The judge, who, only two days before the hearing, inexplicably replaced the appointed judge (whom Bernecker considered to be fair) threw out the case the same day.  http://www.ecotalk.org/Pandora'sBlackBox.htm 

39.   1995 Louisiana - ... Republican supporters of U.S. Senate candidate Woody Jenkins ...cried foul in his election ...With only ten minutes left in the count, and losing by a few thousand votes, Jenkins’ opponent suddenly surged ahead with ten thousand votes that came out of the predominantly inner city Orleans parish, which had been noted for low voter turnouts. But, in her local paper it was said to have enjoyed a turnout of 105%! http://www.ecotalk.org/Pandora'sBlackBox.htm 

40.   1996 Massachusetts - "One most recent example of a local story with little or no national coverage was the November Democrat Primary race for the Massachusetts’ 10th District seat in the U.S. Congress, where challenger Philip Johnston – who had been declared the winner over entrenched Democrat nominee, William Delahunt – lost the nomination on a bizarre second recount. Johnston told Relevance: "The court looked at some disputed punchcard ballots which had already been declared to be blank and the court declared them to be actual votes." Suspiciously, 756 of the 968disputed punchcard ballots came out of the same community –Weymouth, Mass – suggesting that either "Weymouthenians" are shamefully inferior cardpunchers than their neighbors in the rest of the state, or someone may have tampered with the ballots. The State’s Supreme Judicial Court examined the suspect ballots to determine "voter intent" by detecting "dimples" and other faint markings and somehow ended up awarding 469votes to Delahunt and 177 to Johnston, thereby reversing the latter’s victory." http://www.ecotalk.org/Pandora'sBlackBox.htm 

41.   1997 Florida 04/07 The Tampa Tribune - Bob Stamper, a 10-year state attorney investigator, usually works on white-collar crime cases. But his investigation at the supervisor of elections office involves no crime. Rather, the probe is focusing on a ballot count that landed Republican Bruce L. Parker at the top of the heap election night, but later unseated him in favor of Democrat Marlene Duffy Young after a court-ordered hand recount. Todd Urosevich, a vice president of American Information Systems [now ES&S], which made Polk's troubled ballot-counting equipment, already has been interviewed by Stamper, and told Stamper his machines were not responsible for the miscount. http://www.talion.com/election-machines.html 

42.   1998 Hawaii - Faulty ES&S machines used in Hawaii's 1998 elections forced that state's first-ever recount. The company paid $250,000 to settle contract disputes and $280,000 to recount the ballots after complaints about poorly trained poll watchers, malfunctioning voting machines and spoiled ballots. Nonetheless, the state and ES&S have been negotiating a new eight-year contract to count ballots in the next four elections, said Dwayne Yoshina, Hawaii's chief election officer. Two other potential bidders dropped out of competition. http://starbulletin.com/2000/06/07/news/story3.html

43.   2000 Florida - History repeats itself again and again and again. "Undervotes"--the failure of votes to register on a voted ballot--occurred on about 10,000 ballots in Palm Beach County this year, where Vice President Al Gore has strong support. In 1988, in MacKay's four Democratic stronghold counties, there were 210,000 people who voted for president but did not vote in the U.S. Senate race. In a comparable U.S. Senate race in a presidential-election year--1980--in the same four counties, three out of every 100 presidential voters did not vote for senator; in 1988, 14 of every 100 did not. In the entire state of Florida, excluding the four MacKay counties, fewer than one of 100 presidential voters--25,000--were not recorded as also voting in the Senate race. Three of the MacKay counties in 1988 are among Gore's big four recount counties. http://www.notablesoftware.com/Press/Dugger1.html 

44.   2000 Florida - An entire precinct had been left uncounted. The ballots had been run through the card reader, but the operator had pressed CLEAR instead of SET. (The recount gave Gore +368, Bush +23.) In Deland, Volusia County, a disk glitch caused 16,000 votes to be subtracted from Gore and hundreds added to Bush in the original totals. This was detected when 9,888 votes were noticed for the Socialist Workers Party candidate, and a new disk was created. (The corrected results were Gore 193, Bush 22, Harris 8.)  In Pinellas County, election workers were conducting a SECOND recount after the first recount gave Gore more than 400 new votes. Some cards that were thought to have been counted were not.[ Source: Democrats tell of problems at the polls across Florida, The New York Times, November 10, 2000, National Edition, p. A24] http://www.ejfi.org/Voting/Voting-9.htm 

  1. 2000 - Florida - Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach County, Florida, who some say single handedly cost Al Gore the presidency, is back with another debacle. Her office is being sued by the former Republican mayor of Boca Raton, Emil Danciu, who claims that the city council election held last March should be re-run due to malfunctions in the new $14 million dollar computer voting machines LePore bought from Sequoia Voting Systems Inc.. Rob Ross was the lead attorney http://www.ecotalk.org/Dr.RebeccaMercuriComputerVoting.htm

46.   2000 New Jersey 02/18/ THE RECORD, Northern New Jersey About 75 percent of the voting machines in the city of Passaic failed to work when the polls opened on Election Day, forcing an undetermined number of voters to use paper ballots during the morning hours. An independent consultant who later examined the machines concluded the problem was due to sabotage, which has led a Democratic freeholder to refer the matter to the FBI. http://www.talion.com/election-machines.html 

47.   2000 Pennsylvania 11/14 - Pittsburgh Post Gazette City Councilwoman Valerie McDonald yesterday called for an investigation of voting machine irregularities at polling places in Lincoln-Lemington, Homewood and the East Hills last week, saying machines in the city's 12th and 13th wards and other predominantly black neighborhoods were malfunctioning for much of Election Day. McDonald said both machines at a Lincoln-Lemington polling place were out of service for the first three hours, driving away 50 voters. Several machines were in and out of service at 13th Ward polling places in Homewood and East Hills, smoking and spitting out jammed and crumpled paper and leaving poll workers to wait hours for repair by Allegheny County elections division workers. Workers in the polling places "strongly felt that the machines were intentionally programmed incorrectly ... and were sabotaged,"  http://www.talion.com/election-machines.html 

48.   2000 Venezuela - Associated Press (AP) reporter Jessica Fargen wrote in June 2000, "ES&S has felt the most fallout from its problems in Venezuela, where that nation's highest court suspended the May 28 elections because of technical glitches in the cards used to tabulate votes. Dozens of protesters have chanted "Gringos get out!" at ES&S technicians working in Venezuela's election offices. The U.S. Embassy in Caracas has protested the treatment by secret police of ES&S personnel, including alleged verbal and physical abuse and threats. Venezuela sent an air force jet to Omaha to fetch computers and experts in a last-ditch effort to fix the problem before the delay was ordered. Venezuela's president and the head of the nation's election board accused ES&S of trying to destabilize the country's electoral process." http://starbulletin.com/2000/06/07/news/story3.html 

49.   2001 Texas 11/19 Houston Chronicle "We have a problem where voters are being turned away from polls even though they have the proper identification," said Joe Householder, spokesman for the Brown campaign. "A potential reason may be that computers were down, but that is not an excuse. The law is pretty clear on this." A computer problem cut off access to the county's voter registration database for about one hour after polls opened Saturday afternoon, said Tony Sirvello, administrator of elections for the Harris County Clerk's Office. ...the problem affected four polling sites: the Fiesta Mart on Kirby, the Spring Branch Community Center, Kashmere Multi-Service Center and the Sunnyside Multi-Service Center http://www.talion.com/election-machines.html 

50.   2002 Alabama - No one at ES&S can explain the mystery votes that changed after polling places had closed, flipping the election from the Democratic winner to a Republican in the Alabama Governor's race. "Something happened. I don't have enough intelligence to say exactly what," said Mark Kelley, of Election Systems & Software. Baldwin County results showed that Democrat Don Siegelman earned enough votes to win the state of Alabama. All the observers went home. The next morning, however, 6,300 of Siegelman's votes inexplicably disappeared, and the election was handed to Republican Bob Riley. A recount was requested, but denied. The "glitch" is still being examined. (By a citizens group?) No. (By a judge?) No. (By an independent computer expert?) No. (By someone who works for ES&S?) Yes. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 

51.   2002 California - California machines that can't add: The problem in Monterey, California was that the department's mainframe computers refused to add the results of early absentee votes and those cast on touch-screen computers prior to Election Day. "We didn't have any problems whatsoever during our pre-election tests," said the elections official. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 

52.   2002 California - 103,000 votes lost by computers in Broward County. In California, all the "Yes" votes registered as "No." http://www.talion.com/vote-rigging.html 

53.   2002 California 02/11/ - The San Francisco Chronicle Jones' investigation raised the specter of massive inaccuracies in the November 2000 vote count -- enough to put in question the election of some members of the Board of Supervisors...For instance, in precinct 3213 on Russian Hill, the city reported counting 328 ballots and 327 signatures were in the roster. But when state investigators opened the box for that precinct that city officials pulled from storage, they found only 170 ballots. In one precinct, the major discrepancies found by Jones seem to have existed on election night as well. In polling place 2214 in the Western Addition, the city counted 416 ballots, but there were only 362 signatures in the roster, and the secretary of state found only 357 paper ballots. http://www.talion.com/election-machines.html 

  1. 2002 Florida - Janet Reno's (primary) campaign for governor is trying to build a sweeping case against the now-infamous touch-screen voting machines that campaign officials believe may be responsible for Reno's losing thousands of votes in the Democratic primary. Among the allegations: Touch-screen machines suffer from a buildup of smudges that create inaccuracies as more people vote; some voters saw the wrong candidate's name light up when they touched the screen; many machines may not have properly calculated votes; and some machines had more than the typical percentage of ballots without a vote in the gubernatorial primary. Election Systems and Software, the company that manufactures the iVotronic machines used in Miami-Dade and Broward counties, could not be reached late Saturday. Last week, ES&S said in a statement that its machines ``accurately captured 100 percent of the votes which were cast. No votes were lost or not counted.'' http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/state/4077014.htm 
  2. 2002 Florida -  McBride was a tough guy to vote for: One voter said that he tried 10 times, and every time he pressed McBride the Bush choice lit up. He could only get his vote to light up the McBride choice when he pressed a dead area of the screen. No paper trail was available, so no one really knows who got any of the votes — regardless of which candidate lit up. Similar problems were reported in various permutations, for various candidates, by several Florida voters, and an identical problem was noted in Texas. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  3. 2002 Florida - Only 103,000 votes went missing in Florida, and only 91,000 voters were wrongfully purged from the rolls. Though there is no paper trail, officials assure us that the counts were correct. And the purged voters get their votes back — after the election is over. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  4. 2002 Florida - 09/17 The Bradenton Herald (Florida) Union County...has had trouble-free elections dating back at least to the early 1920s as the only county in Florida that continued to hand count its ballots. But that changed this year... ...But counting the county's 2,642 ballots using the new optical-scan machinery this year took two days, after a programming error rendered the automatic count useless. So it was back to the tried-and-true hand count for Union County, which is about 130 miles east of Tallahassee. The equipment vendor, Election Systems and Software Inc., accepted responsibility for the problems, which were caused when a printing error gave both Republican and Democratic ballots the same code. The machines read them both as Republican. Todd Urosevich, vice-president of election product sales, said the company will pick up the expenses for the hand count and apologized to the county. http://www.talion.com/election-machines.html 
  5. 2002 Florida - November 10, http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=14 This whistleblower is an accountant, and he took it upon himself to call Century Village. He was told that their occupancy has remained stable (around 13,000 residents) since the complex hit capacity in 1998.  Miami Herald listed the following figures for the total votes cast at the Democrat-friendly Broward County Century Village precinct in the general election:

    1994: 7,515
    1998: 10,947
    2002: 4,179
  6. 2002 Florida - "I was the clerk of a precinct in Broward County FL. We counted exactly the number of voters who voted on the machines. The total was 713, however the machine count was 749. I reported this information to the Broward County Staff upon returning my supplies that evening after the election. "They, to my disbelief, thought they had a successful election. They told me if the difference between the actual voters and the machine vote was 10% that that was within their acceptable range. "Imagine this could be 100,000 votes per million votes cast! And who would ever know what candidate or issue they were assigned to. "If you like please contact me..." Thank you. Ellen In a follow up, we obtained her notarized affidavit, which contains a statement that Mike Lindsay, from the Florida Division of Elections, told her that the state of Florida would not certify any machine that produced a paper trail. This matches another report we received, from a voting machine manufacturer who was told that it is illegal to have a paper trail in the state of Florida. When he asked to see the law, they could not produce it. Ellen also says that the ES&S machines purchased in Broward County were bought while they were not certified. This is corroborated by a statement from another witness, and bears looking into further. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=15 
  7. 2002 Georgia - In one county ballots in at least three precincts listed the wrong county commission races. Officials shut down the polls to fix the problem but didn't know how many wrong ballots were cast or how to correct errant votes. In another, a county commission race was omitted from a ballot. Cards voters need to access machines malfunctioned. Elsewhere, machines froze up and dozens were had software programming errors. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  8. 2002 Georgia - Officials forgot where they put their memory cards: Fulton County election officials said that memory cards from 67 electronic voting machines had been misplaced, so ballots cast on those machines were left out of previously announced vote totals. No hand count can shine any light on this; the entire state of Georgia went to touch-screen machines with no physical record of the vote. Fifty-six cards, containing 2,180 ballots, were located, but 11 memory cards still were missing Thursday evening. Bibb County and Glynn County each had one card missing after the initial vote count. When DeKalb County election officials went home early Wednesday morning, they were missing 10 cards. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  9. 2002 Kansas 8/22 Wichita Eagle (KS) Election reversed in Clay County - The discovery of a computer glitch reversed one outcome from this month's primary elections in Kansas, and an unsuccessful candidate in another race has based his request for a special election on alleged technical difficulties. In Clay County, computer results from a County Commission primary showed challenger Roy Jennings defeating incumbent Jerry Mayo by 22 votes The hand recount, completed Tuesday, revealed Mayo as the winner -- and by a landslide, 540 votes to 175. In one ward, which Mayo carried 242-78, the computer had mistakenly reversed the totals. And in the absentee voting, which originally showed a 47-44 edge for Jennings, a hand count found Mayo winning 72-19. http://www.talion.com/election-machines.html 
  10. 2002 Louisiana - "I can't say every precinct had a problem, but the vast majority did" -- Tangipahoa Parish, Louisiana Clerk of Court John Dahmer said at least 20 percent of the machines in his parish malfunctioned. "One percent might be acceptable, but we're not even close to that," Dahmer said. He said 15 employees worked to combat the malfunctions. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  11. 2002 Louisiana - More than 200 machine malfunctions reported in Ascension Parish (Louisiana): An elections official gnashed his teeth as more than 200 machine malfunctions were called in. The Parish Clerk said his staff was on the road repairing machines from 5 a.m. to 9 p.m. In one case, a machine wasn't repaired until 12:30 a.m. Wednesday. "A mechanic would fix a machine, and before he could get back to the office, it would shut down again," Bourque said. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  12. 2002 Louisiana - All the king's horses and all the king's men…couldn't put the tally together again: With a 34-vote margin separating the two justice of the peace candidates in St. Bernard Parish (Louisiana), the machine ate 35 absentee votes and left everyone guessing about the outcome of the race. The ballots became inaccessible when the system locked up; even the technician couldn't get at them. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  13. 2002 Maryland - Vote Republican (read "Democrat") — In Maryland, a software programming error upset a lot of voters when they saw a banner announcing "Democrat" at the top of their screen, no matter who they voted for. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  14. 2002 Nebraska - When all else fails, use duct tape: In Sarpy County, Nebraska, they used duct tape to stick a block of wood under the machine — that's the only way it would feed votes through. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  15. 2002 Nebraska - Candidate for governor finds vote-counting computer asleep: I spoke with Paul Rosberg, the Nebraska Party candidate for governor, who told me he eagerly took advantage of a Nebraska law that lets candidates watch their votes being counted. He first was invited to watch an optical scanner machine, which had no counter on it, and then was taken into the private room, where he was allowed to watch a computer on a table with a blank screen. So much for public counting of votes. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  16. 2002 Nebraska - Nearly a day later, no votes were counted in Adams County. A software programming error from ES&S caused the problem, County Election Commissioner Chris Lewis said. Attempts to clear up the problem, including using a backup machine, failed. The problem affected at least 12,000 ballots. "The irony is they had one of the newest pieces of voting equipment in the state," said Nebraska Secretary of State John Gale." http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  17. 2002 Nebraska - This crushing defeat never happened: Vote-counting machines failed to tally "yes" votes on the Gretna school-bond issue (Nebraska), giving the false impression that the measure failed miserably. The measure actually passed by a 2-1 margin. Responsibility for the errors was attributed to ES&S, the Omaha company that provided the ballots and the machines. New Jersey - "What the hell do I do with this?" — A bag full of something that looked like rolls of cash register tapes was handed to the County Clerk. A computer "irregularity" in a New Jersey vote-counting system caused three of five relay stations to fail, leaving a single county clerk holding the bag for a hand count. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  18. 2002 New Mexico - Candidate declared victory prematurely: New Mexico candidate Heather Wilson declared herself the victor and made a speech, even though the margin was only 51:49 and votes weren't fully counted. First reports explained that "thousands of new votes had been found but not counted." Later, when thousands of new votes were not discovered after all, the reason for her victory premonition was changed to an influx of uncounted absentee votes, 2:1 for Wilson. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  19. 2002 New Mexico - A software programming error caused machine to count the wrong names: In Taos, New Mexico just 25 votes separated the candidates in one race; another race had a 79-vote margin. After noticing that the computer was counting votes under the wrong names, Taos County Clerk Jeannette Rael contacted the programmer of the optical machine and was told it was a software programming error. The votes were then hand-counted. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  20. 2002 New Jersey - 44 of 46 machines malfunction in New Jersey: Election workers had to turn away up to 100 early voters when it was discovered that 96 percent of the voting machines couldn't register votes for the Mayor, despite having the machines pre-tested and certified for use. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  21. 2002 New York - Voting machine tallies impounded in New York: Software programming errors hampered and confused the vote tally on election night and most of the next day, causing elections officials to pull the plug on the vote-reporting web site. Commissioners ordered that the voting machine tallies be impounded, and they were guarded overnight by a Monroe County deputy sheriff. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  22. 2002 North Carolina -  Trying to find 300 voters so they can vote again: In North Carolina, one out of four new touch-screen voting machines failed in early voting, losing 294 votes. The machines were shut down before Election Day, so election workers looked for the 294 voters to ask them to vote again. (A paper trail would have solved this problem.) http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  23. 2002 North Carolina -  A software programming error overturned the result: In North Carolina, a software programming error caused vote-counting machines to skip over several thousand party-line votes, both Republican and Democratic. Machines aren't supposed to get past quality control, and certainly not past certification, and definitely not past pretesting, if their programming is so flawed. But everyone seemed to yawn. Fixing the error turned up 5,500 more votes and reversed the election. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  24. 2002 Ohio - In Ohio, a vote-counting machine malfunctioned with 12 of the county's 67 precincts left to count. A back-up vote-counting machine was found, but it also could not read the vote. Election workers piled into a car and headed to another county to tally their votes. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  25. 2002 Pennsylvania - One hundred percent error tabulating Libertarian votes: In Pennsylvania, a voter reported that he had followed his conscience and voted Libertarian. When he reviewed the results for his precinct, though, the Libertarian candidate received zero votes. Two ways to look at this: Unimportant, just a vote; or, a 100 percent error. Either way, why bother to vote? http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  26. 2002 South Carolina - Two South Carolina precincts working to extract information from the computer: Pickens County was unable to get totals from two precincts because of software programming errors. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 
  27. 2002 South Carolina - A software programming error of 55 percent: In South Carolina, and it caused more than 21,000 votes in the squeaker-tight race for S.C. commissioner of agriculture to be uncounted; only a hand-count was able to sort it out. Good thing there were paper ballots. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12  
  28. 2002 South Dakota - Double-counting votes in South Dakota: Blamed on "flawed chip." ES&S sent a replacement chip; voter demanded that the original chip be impounded and examined. Who gets to examine it? ES&S. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12 

82.   2002 Texas - In Comal County Texas, the uncanny coincidence of three winning Republican candidates in a row tallying up exactly 18,181 votes each was called weird, but apparently no one thought it was weird enough to audit. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=13 / http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/news/110802_sn_number.html 

83.   2002 Texas - A Republican landslide turned into a Democratic landslide when election officials in Scurry County, Texas did a hand count. http://www.talion.com/vote-rigging.html 

84.   2002 Texas - (page doesn't work) ES&S machines accused of flubbing 2002 Dallas votes
Push Democrat, vote Republican; election halted http://www.talion.com/election-machines.html 

85.   2002 Texas - When 18 machines were pulled out of action in Dallas because they registered Republican when voters pushed Democrat, the judge quashed an effort to investigate the accuracy of the tally. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=13 

86.   2002 Texas - But when Scurry County poll workers got suspicious about a landslide victory for Republicans, they had a new computer chip flown in and also counted the votes by hand — and found out that Democrats actually won by wide margins, overturning the election. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=13

  1. 2003 Canada - "In January 2003, during Canada's New Democratic Party leadership convention, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reported, “Earl Hurd of Election.com said he believes someone used a "denial of service" program to disrupt the voting – paralyzing the central computer by bombarding it with a stream of data”…service was restored, then… "Toronto city councilor Jack Layton's victory on the first ballot surprised many, who had expected a second or even third round of voting before a leader was chosen from the pack of six candidates." http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2003/01/25/ndp_delay030125 Editor's note: For election security experts, a strong and growing suspicion is that computer glitches or disruptions are actually vote rigging. A surprise election result should raise a red flag.
  2. 2003 Special Report - Dan Spillane, a voting machine test engineer, has filed a lawsuit against his former employer, DRE touch-screen voting machine manufacturer VoteHere. Spillane's lawsuit charges wrongful and retaliatory termination; he contends he was removed so that he could not blow the whistle to certification labs and pass critical information to the US General Accounting Office. He says he has evidence which shows voting systems are certified despite known flaws, demonstrating a weakness in both the NASED and the ITA system for certifying machines. http://www.blackboxvoting.com/votehere-lawsuit-1.html 
  3. Jun 26, 03 Johns Hopkins Report: Numerous security flaws are identified in a newly published paper entitled 'Analysis of an Electronic Voting System' by Tadayoshi Kohno (JHU), Adam Stubblefield (JHU), Aviel Rubin (JHU), and Dan Wallach (Rice University). http://www.jhuisi.jhu.edu Read about it: The Baltimore Sun (Front Page), MSNBC News, CNN, New York Times, The Washington Post, Reuters, CNET News, Scoop, and Headlines@Hopkins.

 

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